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PIERCING THE VEIL OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN 
MEDIATION TO ENSURE GOOD FAITH PARTICIPATION 
An Untenable Position? 
Confidentiality is a foundational characteristic of the 
mediation process, a key feature that distinguishes mediation 
from litigation. However, the veil of confidentiality has been 
lifted for several purposes, including the courts’ assessment 
of the parties’ conduct so as to ensure good faith 
participation in the mediation. This article discusses how 
mediation confidentiality and good faith participation may 
be concurrently promoted. It reviews the current approaches 
to upholding the general confidentiality and inadmissibility 
of mediation communications, and proposes ways to ensure 
that the veil of mediation confidentiality is pierced in highly 
circumscribed circumstances. It then examines the issue of 
whether to mandate good faith participation in mediation. 
This author proposes the articulation of a good faith 
obligation in order to send the correct signal about the 
expected conduct within mediation. However, the author also 
suggests that sanctions be imposed only for breaches of 
objective requirements, and the presence of highly egregious 
conduct within mediation. Otherwise, the veil of 
confidentiality would be readily lifted, to the overall 
detriment of the mediation process. 
Dorcas Quek ANDERSON 
LLB (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Assistant Professor and Della Suantio Fellow,  
School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 Confidentiality is the primary philosophical tenet1 of the 
mediation process, a key feature that distinguishes mediation from 
litigation. The mediator’s opening statement typically assures the parties 
about the private and confidential nature of the process, so as to 
encourage effective participation in mediation. There has been judicial 
affirmation of the need to give protection to the parties to negotiate 
freely about all issues without the fear of adverse consequences in future 
                                                          
1 Penny Brooker, Mediation Law: Journal through Institutionalism to Juridification 
(Routledge, 2013) at p 185. 
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litigation.2 The protection of the mediator from being compelled to give 
evidence has also been deemed integral in preserving the neutral role of 
the mediator.3 
2 Nevertheless, mediation confidentiality has never been absolute. 
Paradoxically, an opaque mediation that is immune from public scrutiny 
may run the risk of threatening the very integrity of the process. The veil 
of confidentiality has thus been lifted for several purposes, including the 
assessment of the parties’ conduct so as to ensure good faith 
participation in the mediation. An increasing amount of mediation 
legislation has emerged across common law jurisdictions to empower 
the court to sanction conduct evincing bad faith participation. However, 
piercing the veil of mediation confidentiality in order to monitor 
mediation behaviour may inadvertently compromise the quintessential 
characteristic of the mediation process. How then should the legal 
infrastructure supporting mediation be properly structured to ensure 
meaningful participation while simultaneously protecting the 
confidentiality of mediation communications? 
3 This article discusses the related issues of mediation 
confidentiality and good faith participation, with the overarching goal of 
examining how both aspects of mediation can be concurrently 
promoted. Part II4 evaluates the common law and legislative approaches 
to upholding the general confidentiality and inadmissibility of 
mediation communications. It focuses, in particular, on the interaction 
between the Singapore Mediation Act5 (“MA”) and common law 
concepts that have conventionally been relied on to preserve mediation 
confidentiality. It also proposes ways to ensure that the veil of 
confidentiality is pierced in highly circumscribed situations. The next 
part6 examines the controversial question of whether good faith 
participation within mediation should be mandated. It assesses the 
potential impact of such a duty on mediation confidentiality and other 
implications. It further discusses the type of mediation conduct that is 
expected by the Singapore courts and other professional conduct rules, 
as well as several common law jurisdictions. This author proposes the 
articulation of a good faith obligation in order to send the correct signal 
about the expected conduct within mediation. However, it is also 
proposed that sanctions be imposed only for breaches of objective 
                                                          
2 See, eg, Ofulue v Bossert [2009] 2 All ER (D) 119 at [98] and Unilever Plc v 
Procter & Gamble Co [2000] 1 WLR 2436 at 2437–2438. 
3 Hilary Astor, “Mediator Neutrality: Making Sense of Theory and Practice” (2007) 
16(2) S&LS 221, referred to in Andrew Agpiou & Bryan Clark, “The Practical 
Significance of Confidentiality in Mediation” (2018) 37(1) CJQ 74 at 76. 
4 See paras 4–24 below. 
5 Act 1 of 2017. 
6 See paras 26–57 below. 
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requirements, and the presence of highly egregious conduct within 
mediation. Otherwise, the veil of confidentiality would be readily lifted, 
to the overall detriment of the mediation process. 
II. Confidentiality in mediation 
A. Confidentiality and competing interests 
4 Confidentiality within mediation can be said to be a double-
edged sword. Although it encourages candid negotiations, absolute 
confidentiality within mediation could also be a cloak for unfair 
treatment of vulnerable parties. Without judicial oversight, the parties’ 
consensual agreement may also harm the interests of third parties. It has 
been further argued that the veil of confidentiality prevents challenges 
to the fairness of the mediation process, such as the breach of the 
mediator’s ethical duties or the coercion of parties in reaching a 
settlement. The need to monitor the process is also much greater if 
parties’ participation in mediation is mandated. 
5 Furthermore, although mediation is deemed to be an out-of-
court process that is free from legal formalities, this mode of dispute 
resolution requires the courts’ assistance in order to flourish. Evidence 
of mediated settlement agreements may need to be disclosed for the 
enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. A party cannot, in the 
name of confidentiality, blatantly ignore its obligations under the 
mediated settlement.7 In sum, the veil of confidentiality has to be 
pierced in limited circumstances to support the mediation process and 
affirm the effectiveness of mediation as a mode of settlement. Mediation 
confidentiality has to be balanced with the need to maintain the 
integrity and fairness of mediation. 
6 Nevertheless, the interest in maintaining fairness within 
mediation has resulted in an ever-increasing list of circumstances 
justifying the lifting of the veil of confidentiality. There is the risk of the 
exception becoming the norm, and mediation being a porous process 
that is frequently subjected to public scrutiny. Many jurisdictions have 
grappled with balancing confidentiality with other competing interests, 
and Singapore is no exception. The next part proceeds to discuss 
Singapore’s approach in ensuring that the veil of confidentiality is 
pierced only in limited and clearly defined circumstances.8 
                                                          
7 Elle E Deason, “Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law 
Collides with Confidentiality” (2001–2002) 35 UC Davis L Rev 33 at 37. 
8 See paras 7–24 below. 
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B. Pre-legislation approach to confidentiality and admissibility 
of mediation communications 
7 Prior to the enactment of the Mediation Act in Singapore in 
2017, the confidentiality of mediation communications was protected by 
a mixture of common law privileges and contractual protections, 
a situation which the Senior Minister of State for Law described as 
“thoroughly confusing to the individual mediation user”.9 In general, the 
law has largely relied on two overlapping concepts of confidentiality and 
admissibility. “Confidentiality” refers to the obligation of all the parties 
not to disclose mediation communications to any third party. Mediation 
confidentiality is premised on two sources – an express obligation of 
confidentiality in the mediation contract, and implied confidentiality.10 
The duty of confidentiality can only be breached when all the parties, 
including the mediator, collectively waive it. However, regardless of any 
waiver, the court may still order the disclosure of mediation 
communications when it is “in the interest of justice” to do so.11 Hence, 
confidentiality per se does not preclude the mediation communications 
from being admissible in court. In this respect, English commentator 
Bartlett observed that contractual confidentiality “does not itself provide 
a shield against a witness summons [of the mediator] or determine the 
issue of admissibility”.12 
8 By contrast, the concept of admissibility is an evidential one, 
referring to situations when mediation communications may be 
properly admitted in court. Both the English and Singapore courts have 
relied heavily on the “without prejudice” rule to decide on admissibility. 
Under this principle, statements or documents used in the course of 
negotiations for settlement purposes are not admissible as evidence.13 In 
the English Court of Appeal decision of Aird v Prime Meridian Ltd,14 
May LJ affirmed the application of the without prejudice privilege to 
mediation communications.15 
                                                          
9 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 January 2017) vol 94 
(Indranee Rajah SC, Senior Minister of State for Law). 
10 Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(No 2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228. 
11 Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(No 2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228 at [29]. 
12 Michael Bartlet, “Mediation Secrets in the Shadow of the Law” (2015) 34 CJQ 112 
at 113. 
13 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280, followed in 
Singapore by Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd [2006] 
4 SLR(R) 807 at [24]–[28]; and Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan [2012] 
1 SLR 457 at [94]–[97]. 
14 [2006] EWCA Civ 1866. 
15 Aird v Prime Meridian Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1866 at [5]. 
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9 Although the without privilege rule provides greater protection 
to mediation communications than implied or contractual 
confidentiality, it is fraught with uncertainty and inadequacies. In 
Singapore, there is some ambivalence concerning the sources of the rule. 
It appears to be derived from both common law and s 23 of the 
Evidence Act,16 which provides that: 
… no admission is relevant if it is made either upon an express 
condition that evidence of it is not to be given, or under circumstances 
from which the court can infer that the parties agreed together that 
evidence of it should not be given. 
This section applies the “without prejudice” rule only to the parties 
involved in the negotiations.17 However, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
has acknowledged that common law also extends the rule to third 
parties.18 As such, the scope of the applicability of the rule is not 
altogether clear. 
10 In addition, the concurrent reliance on common law and the 
Evidence Act has resulted in uncertainty about whether the rule is 
synonymous with a privilege held by the parties. Pinsler has noted that 
s 23 is technically not a privilege because it only states that such 
admission is not relevant. Admissibility of relevant facts is determined 
by law and not subject to the party’s intention, whereas the doctrine of 
privilege is concerned with a party’s right to withhold information, 
a right he can maintain or abandon through consent or waiver. 
Nonetheless, Pinsler posits that the principle of waiver is still applicable 
in the context of communications for the purpose of settlement.19 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v 
Dextra Asia Co Ltd20 expressly referred to a privilege while discussing 
the without prejudice rule.21 It is therefore arguable that the Singapore 
courts have treated s 23 as equivalent to a common law privilege despite 
the dissonance between legislation and common law. 
11 In the event that the rule indeed operates as a common law 
privilege, the privilege may still fall short of providing sufficient 
protection of mediation communications. It appears that only the 
                                                          
16 Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed. 
17 The High Court in Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan [2010] SGHC 35 at [8]–[11] 
specifically held that the “without prejudice” rule in relation to s 23 of the Evidence 
Act (Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed) applied to communications made between the parties 
with the assistance of a mediator. 
18 Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807 at [28]. 
19 Jeffrey Pinsler, Evidence and the Litigation Process (LexisNexis, 4th Ed, 2013) 
at para 15.011. 
20 [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807. 
21 Mariwu Industrial Co (S) Pte Ltd v Dextra Asia Co Ltd [2006] 4 SLR(R) 807 at [26]. 
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parties, and not the mediator, may waive the privilege protecting their 
“without prejudice” communications.22 It is not a privilege owned by the 
mediator. In Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (No 2)23 (“Farm Assist”), the court ordered the 
mediator to be a witness because the disputing parties had waived their 
privilege, and the court deemed the disclosure to be in the interest of 
justice. The parties had agreed in their mediation agreement not to call 
the mediator as a witness in any litigation and arbitration relating to the 
dispute. Despite this contractual clause, Ramsey J decided that the 
parties were entitled to and did waive their privilege. The mediator’s 
right to rely on the confidentiality clause was also overridden by the 
interest of justice here. This ruling effectively means that a mediator 
may have to testify on “without prejudice” matters against his or her 
will, and despite the parties’ prior agreement not to do so. Consequently, 
the parties’ contractual agreement regarding inadmissibility and 
confidentiality of mediation communications would offer feeble 
protection of mediation privacy. 
12 Unsurprisingly, this state of affairs has been criticised as being 
highly dissatisfactory and inconsistent with professional mediation 
practice.24 Summarising the disconcerting impact of this legal position, 
Briggs LJ wrote that:25 
… [t]here is widespread concern that if the confidentiality which 
surrounds the mediation process is limited to that conferred by the 
without prejudice principle, and if attempts to widen it by contract are 
likely to be ineffective, then mediation will lose one of its main 
attractions as a dispute resolution process. 
In a similar vein, Kirkham J in Cumbria Waste Management v Baines 
Wilson26 expressed concern about the insufficient protection of 
mediation discussions, stating that “the court should support the 
mediation process by refusing, in the normal circumstances, to order 
disclosure of documents and communications within a mediation”.27 
Other commentators have called for the creation of a mediation 
privilege that also belongs to the mediator.28 They have noted the 
                                                          
22 Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(No 2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228 at [29]. 
23 [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228. 
24 Michael Bartlet, “Mediation Secrets in the Shadow of the Law” (2015) 34 CJQ 112 
at 125, referring to Sir Thomas Bingham’s comment in Re D (Minors) [1993] 
Fam 231; [1993] 2 WLR 721 that it was undesirable in the mediation field that the 
law should drift very far away from the best professional practice. 
25 Justice Briggs, “Mediation Privilege” (2009) 159 New Law Journal 506 at 507. 
26 [2008] EWHC 786 (QB). 
27 Cumbria Waste Management v Baines Wilson [2008] EWHC 786 (QB) at [30]. 
28 David Cornes, “Mediation Privilege and the EU Directive: An Opportunity?” 
(2008) 74(4) Arbitration 384; Justice Briggs, “Mediation Privilege” (2009) 159 New 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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judicial recognition in matrimonial conciliation of a distinct privilege 
based on the public interest in the stability of marriages, and have 
asserted that the public interest in guaranteeing the integrity of 
mediation also warrants the introduction of a mediation privilege.29 
Such a statutory privilege has been enacted in the US Uniform 
Mediation Act30 and within the European Union (“EU”) Mediation 
Directive.31 However, no positive ruling or legislative reform in this 
direction has taken place in either England or Singapore.32 
13 Apart from the above difficulty with the without prejudice 
privilege, there is also inherent uncertainty with the application of the 
privilege due to the fluid and expanding number of exceptions. Robert 
Walker LJ in Unilever plc v The Procter & Gamble Co33 (“Unilever”) set 
out the following exceptions to the rule, and two new exceptions were 
later added in Oceanbulk Shipping and Trading SA v TMT Asia Ltd34 
(“Oceanbulk”): 
(a) evidence of settlement, where there is an issue as to 
whether an agreement has been concluded; 
(b) where evidence of the negotiations is admissible to 
show that an apparent agreement should be set aside on the 
ground of misrepresentation, fraud or undue influence; 
(c) where a clear statement made by one party and on 
which the other party is intended to act, and does so, may give 
rise to an estoppel; 
(d) where exclusion of the evidence would act as a cloak for 
perjury, blackmail or other “unambiguous” impropriety; 
(e) in order to explain delay or apparent acquiescence; 
(f) to prove that the claimant has satisfied a duty to 
mitigate his loss; 
                                                                                                                               
Law Journal 550 at 508; Michel Kallipetis, “Mediation Privilege and Confidentiality 
and the EU Directive” in ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and 
Cultures vol II (Arnold Ingen-Housz ed) (Kluwer Law International, 2011); Anna 
K C Koo, “Confidentiality of Mediation Communications” (2011) 30(2) CJQ 192 
at 201–202. 
29 Justice Briggs, “Mediation Privilege” (2009) 159 New Law Journal 550. 
30 Uniform Mediation Act (2003) (US) §§ 4 and 6. 
31 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
32 Briggs LJ notes that the possible route to the recognition of a special privilege for 
mediation was touched upon in Brown v Rice [2007] EWHC 625 (Ch); [2007] 
All ER (D) 252, but was not pursued: Justice Briggs, “Mediation Privilege” (2009) 
159 New Law Journal 550. 
33 [2000] 1 WLR 2436 at 2444–2445. 
34 [2010] UKSC 44; [2011] 1 AC 662; [2010] 4 All ER 1011. 
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(g) where there is an express or implied agreement that an 
offer is expressly made “without prejudice except as to costs”; 
(h) where there is a dispute as to the interpretation of the 
settlement (Oceanbulk); and 
(i) where a party can rely on anything said to show that 
settlement should be rectified (Oceanbulk, in dicta). 
14 Notably, Lord Neuberger, when commenting on the Unilever 
exceptions in a later case, remarked that it was inappropriate to create 
further exceptions for reasons of legal and practical certainty.35 
Nonetheless, the list has invariably been expanded over time. The UK 
Supreme Court in Oceanbulk noted that exception (i), which has been 
affirmed in Canada and New Zealand, is “scarcely distinguishable from 
the first exception”. Lord Clarke, with whom the rest of the court 
concurred, further decided that there was no sensible line to be drawn 
between the first exception – admitting communications to resolve the 
issue of whether there was a concluded comprise agreement – and 
admitting them to resolve the issue of what the agreement was.36 The 
“interpretation exception” was therefore held to be yet another 
recognised exception to the without prejudice rule (exception (h) 
above).37 
15 The Singapore courts in Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan38 
and Quek Kheng Leong Nicky v Teo Beng Ngoh39 (“Quek Kheng Leong”) 
have thus far applied only the first Unilever exception – when using the 
relevant communications to determine whether a compromise was 
reached and the terms of the compromise agreement.40 Most recently, 
the issue of the applicability of exception (d) – evidence showing 
unambiguous impropriety – arose before the Court of Appeal. However, 
the court declined to make a ruling on this issue, preferring to revisit in 
a future appropriate case with the benefit of fuller arguments.41 
Evidently, the number of exceptions to the without prejudice rule is not 
cast in stone because of the inherently flexible nature of common law. 
The lack of decisive rulings within Singapore case law about the status of 
the other Unilever and Oceanbulk exceptions further contributes to the 
                                                          
35 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] 2 All ER (D) 119 at [98]. 
36 [2010] UKSC 44; [2011] 1 AC 662; [2010] 4 All ER 1011 at [33]. 
37 [2010] UKSC 44; [2011] 1 AC 662; [2010] 4 All ER 1011 at [46]. 
38 [2012] 1 SLR 457. 
39 [2009] 4 SLR(R) 181. 
40 Ng Chee Weng v Lim Jit Ming Bryan [2012] 1 SLR 457 at [95]–[97]; Quek Kheng 
Leong Nicky v Teo Beng Ngoh [2009] 4 SLR(R) 181 at [22]–[24]. 
41 Ernest Ferdinand Perez De La Sala v Compania De Navegacion Palomar, SA [2018] 
1 SLR 894 at [100]. 
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ambivalence of the scope of protection of the without prejudice 
privilege. 
C. Latest legislative approach in Singapore 
16 Undoubtedly, the current state of the law is bewildering to 
mediation users (and probably mediators) and leaves much to be 
desired. It is therefore a welcome relief that the MA, which came into 
operation on 1 November 2017, has clarified the scope of confidentiality 
and inadmissibility of mediation communications. This author has 
previously commented on this piece of legislation,42 and will therefore 
limit the following discussion to several noteworthy aspects of the 
statute. 
(1) The overlap between confidentiality and admissibility 
17 First, the MA has preserved the common law distinction 
between confidentiality and admissibility, while also codifying the 
overlapping aspects. Sections 9 and 10 state that mediation 
communications are confidential and inadmissible in legal proceedings, 
subject to stipulated exceptions. Mediation communications refer to 
anything said or done, document prepared or information provided for 
the purpose of the mediation, and includes the mediation agreement 
entered prior to the mediation and the mediated settlement agreement.43 
Because confidentiality is a precondition to inadmissibility, the Act 
provides for the following exceptions that are common to both 
confidentiality and inadmissibility: 
(a) where the communications are made for the purpose of 
enforcing or disputing a settlement agreement; 
(b) where communications are used for disciplinary 
proceedings for mediator or solicitor misconduct; and 
(c) where disclosure and/or admissibility is needed for the 
purpose of discovery.44 
18 Exceptions (a) and (b) closely correspond with the first 
exception in Unilever and the fourth exception of “unambiguous 
impropriety” respectively. Exception (c) is more controversial, for it 
seems to imply that confidentiality and inadmissibility may be readily 
compromised whenever a party seeks discovery of the relevant 
communications. However, such a position has been heavily criticised. 
                                                          
42 Dorcas Quek Anderson, “A Coming of Age for Mediation in Singapore? Mediation 
Act 2016” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 275. 
43 Mediation Act 2017 (Act 1 of 2017) s 2(1). 
44 Mediation Act 2017 (Act 1 of 2017) s 9(3). 
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In Aird v Prime Meridian Ltd, the English Court of Appeal held that 
joint statements of the parties’ experts prepared for the purpose of trial, 
which were also revealed during the mediation, were not privileged 
because they were specifically prepared under the Civil Procedure 
Rules45 pursuant to a court order.46 English scholars have questioned the 
rationale of this decision, arguing that it is contrary to the public policy 
of encouraging candour in mediations to assert that documents used in 
mediation could subsequently be utilised in litigation.47 As such, 
exception (c) in the MA is unlikely to be construed as a licence to use 
mediation communication for discovery purposes; the court’s leave 
should first be obtained under s 10, based on public policy 
considerations referred to in s 11(2)(b). 
(2) Confidentiality of mediation communications 
19 Secondly, the scope of mediation confidentiality is no longer 
delineated solely by the parties’ private agreement. Mediation 
communications are now accorded legislative protection, subject to the 
above three exceptions and ten other situations listed in s 9(2) of the 
MA. The exceptions are largely uncontroversial, for they largely relate to 
public interest such as protecting a person from harm and assisting in 
the investigation of criminal offences. This approach is consonant with 
the consideration of “the interest of justice” in Farm Assist and in 
Unilever in relation to the without prejudice privilege.48 In all other 
situations that are not listed as exceptions, a person who wishes to 
breach mediation confidentiality must obtain the leave of the court or 
the arbitral tribunal. In deciding whether to grant leave, the court must 
again consider under s 11(2)(b) “whether it is in the public interest or 
interest of the administration of justice for disclosure to be made”. 
20 Thirdly, there is a slight aberration to the statutory regime on 
mediation confidentiality. The current English position maintains that 
confidentiality can be waived by all the disputing parties and the 
mediator, because this duty is drawn from their contractual agreement. 
The without prejudice privilege is held by the parties, and not the 
mediator. However, s 9(2)(a), together with s 2 of the MA, allows 
disclosure when all the parties give their consent. Curiously, the 
                                                          
45 SI 1998 No 3132. 
46 [2006] EWCA Civ 1866. 
47 Andrew Agpiou & Bryan Clark, “The Practical Significance of Confidentiality in 
Mediation” (2018) 37(1) CJQ at 87; Editor, “Case Comment: Discussion between 
Experts and Mediation” (2007) 2 CPN 7 at 7; Hew R Dundas, “When Does 
Confidential Mean Confidential? An Important Development in the Law of 
Mediation and the Without Prejudice Rules” (2007) 73(3) Arbitration 335 at 337. 
48 Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(No 2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228 at [29]. 
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mediator’s permission is not required. This author has earlier argued 
that it is perplexing that the mediator’s consent is not needed before the 
parties decide to breach the sacrosanct duty of confidentiality.49 This 
divergence from common law and common contractual arrangements 
could perhaps be rectified in future amendments of the statute. 
(3) Inadmissibility of mediation communications 
21 With regard to the framework for inadmissibility, the MA has 
stopped short of creating a statutory privilege that is congruent with the 
without prejudice privilege. Section 10 provides that the court’s leave is a 
precondition for any exception to the duty of inadmissibility. By 
implication, the parties themselves may not waive the legislative 
protection of inadmissibility, although they may ostensibly waive 
confidentiality under s 9(2)(a). This is again a departure from the 
common law without prejudice regime, which recognises the parties’ 
entitlement to waive their privilege.50 In addition, the well-established 
exceptions to the privilege in English case law obviates the need for the 
parties to apply for leave prior to admitting the mediation 
communications as evidence. Notwithstanding these minor weaknesses, 
this author has earlier argued that this stricter regime is to be welcomed 
because it places the onus of application on the party seeking to default 
on the general rule of inadmissibility, and prevents the inadvertent 
admission of protected communications that is only rectified later.51 It 
also deters parties from including mediation communications in the 
discovery process under s 9(3)(c), requiring them to first seek leave. 
Furthermore, it underscores the centrality of public interest in 
determining admissibility, which is consistent with the common law 
approach of balancing the interest in encouraging settlement against any 
other public interest. 
22 Nonetheless, the MA has missed the opportunity to create a 
robust mediation privilege that exists in the US Uniform Mediation Act 
and the EU Mediation Directive. The former legislation has been 
implemented in more than ten states, while the latter has been 
                                                          
49 Dorcas Quek Anderson, “A Coming of Age for Mediation in Singapore? Mediation 
Act 2016” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 275 at 282–283. 
50 UK cases such as Farm Assist Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (No 2) [2009] EWHC 1102 (TCC); [2009] All ER (D) 228 and 
Cumbria Waste Management v Baines Wilson [2008] EWHC 786 (QB) have 
referred to a without prejudice “privilege”, though the privilege has been deemed 
to be owned only by the disputing parties. 
51 Dorcas Quek Anderson, “A Coming of Age for Mediation in Singapore? Mediation 
Act 2016” (2017) 29 SAcLJ 275 at 284. 
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incorporated into domestic law in Germany, France, Austria and Italy.52 
The concept of mediation privilege has also been adopted in Malaysia’s 
Mediation Act53 and some Australian states.54 A mediation privilege 
would have provided the greatest protection to mediation and yet 
provided sufficient flexibility by allowing automatic exceptions where 
the privilege has been waived, and allowing the courts to balance the 
relevant competing interests. As such, notwithstanding the helpful 
clarification given by the MA on mediation inadmissibility, the regime 
appears to have removed the parties’ freedom to waiver protection of 
their mediation communications, and shied away from introducing a 
stronger framework that would give the strongest signal about the public 
interest in mediation. 
(4) Dual regimes on confidentiality and inadmissibility of mediation 
communications 
23 Finally, the MA’s regime on confidentiality and inadmissibility 
does not apply to all mediations. Some mediations are presently subject 
to the common law framework. The MA currently excludes mediation 
sessions conducted by the court or taking place under the court’s 
direction, and any mediation proceedings conducted under “any written 
law”.55 Accordingly, mediation sessions conducted by judges, staff or 
volunteers of the Family Justice Courts and the State Courts, and other 
statutory mediation programmes in the Community Mediation 
Centres56 and the Small Claims Tribunals57 will not benefit from the 
clarified framework. The exclusion of certain types of mediation is 
meant to avoid potential inconsistency of the MA with existing 
mediation frameworks that have their own established rules.58 However, 
it is hoped that the incongruous situation of concurrent confidentiality 
regimes for mediations will be rationalised in the near future. 
24 In summary, the enactment of the MA has substantially clarified 
the legal position on mediation confidentiality and inadmissibility. It has 
brought about greater certainty by stipulating the limited circumstances 
relating to public interest when the veil of confidentiality and 
                                                          
52 Michael Bartlet, “Mediation Secrets in the Shadow of the Law” (2015) 34 CJQ 112 
at 120–124. 
53 Mediation Act 2012 (No 749 of 2012) (M’sia) s 16. 
54 See, for instance, s 30 of the New South Wales Civil Procedure Act 2005, s 53 of the 
Queensland Civil Proceedings Act 2011 and s 10 of the Tasmanian Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act 2001. 
55 Mediation Act 2017 (Act 1 of 2017) ss 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(b). 
56 Community Mediation Centres Act (Cap 49A, 1998 Rev Ed). 
57 Small Claims Tribunals Act (Cap 308, 1998 Rev Ed). 
58 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (10 January 2017), vol 94 
(Indranee Rajah SC, Senior Minister of State for Law). 
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inadmissibility can be pierced. In addition, it has expressly affirmed that 
the court should carefully balance confidentiality and inadmissibility 
with both public interest and the administration of justice in all other 
circumstances that have not been provided for in the statute. However, 
the regime could potentially be more robust by introducing a mediation 
privilege that belongs to all the parties and the mediator. The application 
of the Act to only certain types of mediations also reduces the 
effectiveness of the Act. 
III. Good faith participation in mediation 
A. Whither the need for good faith conduct within mediation? 
25 The preceding part59 examined the confidential nature of 
mediation. Being a consensual form of dispute resolution, the mediation 
process has to be insulated from subsequent court scrutiny in order to 
encourage candid negotiation. The communications within mediation 
also have to be shielded from public disclosure, save in very limited 
exceptions. Collectively, the assurance of confidentiality and 
inadmissibility is instrumental in preserving the attraction of mediation 
as a private, informal and non-adjudicative process that allows the 
parties to exercise self-determination. 
26 This present part discusses the growing trend of regulating the 
parties’ mediation conduct. The very notion of appraising and 
regulating mediation conduct seems to run counter to the private and 
non-adjudicative nature of mediation. As a counterpoint to the trial 
process, mediation is meant to provide a safe space for the parties to 
negotiate freely and arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement, without 
any decision being imposed on them. Why then does the need to 
regulate mediation conduct arise? 
27 This question brings to the fore three dilemmas as mediation 
becomes increasingly institutionalised within many jurisdictions’ legal 
landscapes. 
(1) A clash of cultures between informal and formal justice 
28 First, the institutionalisation of mediation within the court 
system has resulted in a less dichotomous distinction between public 
and private dispute resolution options. Mediation is no longer an out-of-
court process akin to the early community mediation movements in the 
US and Australia, which involved the promotion of mediation as a way 
                                                          
59 See paras 4–24 above. 
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to increase party autonomy without involving formal intervention by 
the courts. Instead, the State and the courts have increasingly 
incorporated mediation into the formal justice process, promoting it as 
one of many ways to achieve access to justice.60 Despite the steady 
integration of mediation into the justice system, some dispute resolution 
commentators and courts have been reluctant to regulate mediation 
conduct because of the common perception of mediation being an 
informal process that should be unfettered by excessive legalisation. 
29 One US commentator Thomson characterised this uneasy 
tension as a clash of two competing cultures. He observed how the 
superimposition of a private facilitative process into a public adversarial 
pretrial process has resulted in a “process dissonance”. Thomson posed 
the following questions in this regard:61 
If self-determination and voluntary agreement are key mediation 
values, how can a court compel parties to mediate in good faith in 
circumstances when the parties do not want to settle? If 
confidentiality is a core value, how can a court police the mediation 
process and assure good faith participation without breaching the 
confidentiality of that process? 
30 Similarly, other US scholars have stressed that the attempts to 
punish good faith may cause considerable collateral damage, including 
the inhibition of free expression without the fear of reprisal and major 
intrusion by the courts.62 The imposition of good faith requirements 
within mediation has thus been perceived as an incursion on the 
fundamental mediation values of party autonomy and confidentiality. 
31 On the other hand, the close association of mediation with 
access to justice necessitates some degree of regulation of the process in 
order to ensure that it remains a fair process. This point was alluded to 
above when discussing how confidentiality has to yield to the need to 
protect the parties involved in mediation and other third parties. Where 
the courts have encouraged or mandated the use of mediation, there is 
arguably a greater need to sanction unacceptable mediation conduct. 
                                                          
60 See, eg, The Honourable the Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, “Mediation and the 
Rule of Law”, keynote address at the Law Society Mediation Forum (10 March 
2017), stating at paras 19–23 that mediation helps to bridge access to justice gaps 
by offering efficiency, accessibility and flexibility. 
61 Peter N Thompson, “Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio 
St J on Disp Resol 363 at 364–366. 
62 Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) 
J Disp Resol 367 at 391–392; John Lande, “Why a Good-Faith Requirement Is a 
Bad Idea for Mediation” (2005) 23 Alt to High Cost of Lit 1 at 3; Penny Brooker, 
“Mediating in Good Faith in the English and Welsh Jurisdictions: Lessons from 
Other Common Law Countries” (2014) 43(2) CLWR 120. 
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The National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council 
(“NADRAC”) in Australia underscored this point in its 2011 report, 
where it argued that the public interest in the administration of justice 
and the integrity of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) is best served 
by expressly stipulating that participation in mandatory ADR should be 
undertaken in good faith. It further observed that where there are 
legislative or court requirements to attempt mediation, there is likely to 
be the implicit obligation for disputants to do so in good faith.63 As such, 
a diffident approach to regulating mediation conduct in court-
connected mediation programmes is gravely inconsistent with the 
courts’ active encouragement of the use of mediation as a way to 
enhance access to justice. 
32 Other commentators have similarly argued that the standing of 
the mediation profession has to be protected from potential abuse of the 
process, including using mediation as a fishing expedition for more 
information, engaging in intimidating or coercive conduct, making 
misrepresentations during mediation or using mediation to unduly 
delay the court process. Kovach and Weston have argued strenuously 
that a good faith requirement is necessary to prevent lawyers and their 
clients from simply going through “pro forma mediations” by 
perfunctorily clearing out one of their other hurdles in their pathway to 
trial but failing to participate meaningfully in the mediation. Others 
have suggested that imposing a good faith obligation helps to control the 
widespread tendency of lawyers and clients to approach mediation in an 
adversarial way.64 
33 The above opposing views reflect the unresolved tension 
between the conflicting values underpinning public and private dispute 
resolution processes. The resolution to this dilemma probably lies in 
acknowledging the unavoidable tension that accompanies the growing 
institutionalisation of mediation into the legal infrastructure. Clearly, 
a process that is closely connected to the justice process requires the 
setting of standards on the expected conduct. However, excessive 
intervention runs the risk of distorting the distinctive nature of 
mediation. As with many legal questions, the challenge lies in devising a 
                                                          
63 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Maintaining and 
Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Process: From Principles to Practice through People 
(February 2011) at p 34. 
64 Kimberly K Kovach, “Good Faith in Mediation: Requested, Recommended, or 
Required – A New Ethic” (1997) 38 S Tex L Rev 575 at 595–596; Roger L Carter, 
“Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts 
to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) J Disp Resol 367 at 373; 
John Lande, “Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith 
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs” (2002) 50 UCLA L Rev 69 
at 99–102. 
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properly calibrated approach to set out such standards and to enforce 
them. 
(2) Alleged inconsistency between good faith conduct and the nature 
of negotiation 
34 The second dilemma relates to a perceived conceptual difficulty 
with the notion of exercising good faith within negotiations. The 
mediation process essentially involves the facilitation of the disputants’ 
negotiations. However, certain judicial pronouncements have suggested 
that good faith conduct is inherently incompatible with the nature of 
negotiation. A case in point is the House of Lords’ decision in Walford v 
Miles65 (“Walford”) concerning the enforceability of a contractual term 
to negotiate in good faith. The respondents had entered into 
negotiations with the appellants to sell their business and premises. The 
appellants subsequently alleged that the respondents breached an oral 
agreement to negotiate in good faith with them, to the exclusion of other 
parties. The court decided that an agreement to negotiate in good faith 
for an unspecified period of time was unenforceable. In explaining this 
holding, Lord Ackner suggested that good faith was inconsistent with 
the parties’ usual conduct in negotiations:66 
[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is 
inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when 
involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to 
pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making 
misrepresentations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if he 
thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further 
negotiations or to withdraw in fact, in the hope that the opposite party 
may seek to reopen negotiations by offering him improved terms. 
Mr Naughton, of course, accepts that the agreement upon which he 
relies does not contain a duty to complete the negotiations. But that 
still leaves the vital question – how is a vendor ever to know that he is 
entitled to withdraw from further negotiations? How is the court to 
police such an ‘agreement’? A duty to negotiate in good faith is as 
unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the 
position of a negotiating party. It is here that the uncertainty lies. In 
my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is 
entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any time and for any 
reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to negotiate until 
there is a ‘proper reason’ to withdraw. Accordingly a bare agreement to 
negotiate has no legal content. 
35 Good faith conduct seems to have been associated with acting 
against self-interest and the fettering of one’s freedom to withdraw from 
                                                          
65 [1992] 2 AC 128. 
66 Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 at 138. 
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negotiations “at any time and for any reason”. Lee has characterised this 
basis for the decision in Walford as the “conceptual incongruity 
argument”, which perceives a duty to negotiate in good faith as 
“diametrically opposed to the inherent adversarial nature of 
negotiations”.67 Other common law judgments have expressed the same 
unease with the notion of good faith, suggesting that it entails making 
concessions that prejudices one’s interests. For instance, Giles J in the 
New South Wales case of Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral 
Building Services Pty Ltd68 noted that there was a “necessary tension 
between negotiation, in which a party is free to, and may be expected to, 
have regard to self-interest rather than the interests of the other party, 
and the maintenance of good faith”.69 
36 There has been considerable criticism of this conceptualisation 
of negotiation behaviour. Lee described this view as stemming from an 
“impoverished view of what negotiation can be”, a view that neglects the 
existence of amicable and collaborative styles of negotiation.70 In 
addition, Berg argued that the Walford decision wrongly assumes that 
adversarial, competitive negotiation is the only type of negotiation, thus 
ignoring the existence of the problem-solving approach to negotiation. 
He proposed that an agreement to negotiate in good faith should 
therefore be construed as “an agreement to renounce purely adversarial 
negotiation”.71 Several Australian decisions have clarified that 
negotiation in good faith does not entail reaching a particular 
agreement, and is also not inconsistent with having regard to self-
interest.72 Furthermore, these courts asserted that a good faith obligation 
                                                          
67 Joel Lee, “Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith: HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd” [2013] 
SingJLS 212 at 215. 
68 (1995) 36 NSWLR 709. 
69 Elizabeth Bay Developments Pty Ltd v Boral Building Services Pty Ltd (1995) 
36 NSWLR 709 at 716. In an earlier Australian case of Hooper Bailie Associated 
Ltd v Natcon Group Pty Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 194 at 206 and 209, Giles J 
associated an agreement to negotiate in good faith with an agreement to agree, 
finding that both types of agreements required the co-operation and consent of the 
parties – which could not logically be enforced – and obliged a party to act 
contrary to its interests. 
70 Joel Lee, “Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith: HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd” [2013] 
SingJLS 212 at 219. 
71 Alan Berg, “Promises to Negotiate in Good Faith” (2003) 119 LQR 357 at 363. See 
also Alistair Mills & Rebecca Loveridge, “The Uncertain Future of Walford and 
Miles” (2011) 4 LMCLQ 528 at 531; Jim Mason, “Contracting in Good Faith – 
Giving the Parties What They Want” (2007) 23(6) Construction Law Journal 436 
at 442; and Penny Brooker, “Mediating in Good Faith in the English and Welsh 
Jurisdictions: Lessons from Other Common Law Countries” (2014) 
43(2) CLWR 120. 
72 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] 153 FLR 236 at [82]–[84]. 
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did not prevent a party from withdrawing from negotiations if 
appropriate.73 Notably, the Singapore Court of Appeal, citing an 
Australian decision in approval, reiterated that parties who negotiate in 
good faith are not disentitled from having regard to their own 
commercial self-interests.74 
37 Evidently, the resolution of the conceptual difficulty of good 
faith negotiation requires greater clarity concerning the nature of 
negotiation behaviour. In this regard, dispute resolution research has 
made substantial strides in unravelling the complexity of the negotiation 
process and the range of negotiation styles. Negotiation styles have 
conventionally been labelled as integrative or distributive in approach. 
Integrative bargaining, which has also been known as co-operative, 
problem-solving and value-creating negotiation, aims to maximise the 
overall value for all parties in the negotiation. Negotiators adopting this 
style typically focus on finding joint gains that will meet the interests of 
all the parties instead of merely their own interest. By contrast, the 
distributive approach, also known as value-claiming, adversarial and 
competitive negotiation, concentrates on obtaining the largest value for 
oneself instead of expanding the joint value created by all parties. 
38 Significantly, the integrative style does not envisage the forgoing 
of personal interest. On the contrary, it seeks to maximise personal gains 
by “expanding the pie” for all the parties. As Ury put it, this approach 
acknowledges “the paradox that the best way to be competitive in the 
world is to be co-operative”.75 The benefits of the integrative approach 
have been verified by several studies. For example, Schneider’s 2002 
study showed that problem-solving behaviour that conforms to ethics, 
seeks to achieve a fair settlement, as well as meet both sides’ interests, 
has been perceived as more effective than competitive negotiation.76 
Other studies have shown that when negotiators were given information 
that their counterpart had a co-operative reputation, the negotiation 
achieved an economically better outcome than other negotiations 
without such information on reputation.77 Axelrod, who is best known 
for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, also found that starting with co-operative 
                                                          
73 Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] 153 FLR 236 at [82]–[84]; 
United Group Rail Services Ltd v Rail Corp New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177 
at [79]. 
74 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore 
Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 at [39]. 
75 William Ury, The Third Side (Penguin Group, 1999). 
76 Hal Abramson, “Fashioning an Effective Negotiation Style: Choosing among Good 
Practices, Tactics, and Tricks” in The Negotiator’s Desk Reference (Andrea Kupfer 
Schneider & Chris Honeyman gen eds) (Minnesota: DRI Press, 2017) ch 5 at p 66. 
77 Catherine Tinsley, Jack J Cambria & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “Reputation in 
Negotiation” in The Negotiator’s Desk Reference (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris 
Honeyman gen eds) (Minnesota: DRI Press, 2017) ch 18 at pp 255–256. 
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moves and remaining co-operative as long as it was reciprocated was 
effective even when facing untrustworthy negotiation counterparts.78 
39 The issue of good faith in negotiation is ultimately connected 
with the techniques employed in the different negotiation styles. In this 
regard, the integrative approach usually involves sharing information, 
being inquisitive about the other side’s information, and building 
positive working relationships. By comparison, distributive bargaining 
has been commonly associated with hard bargaining techniques. 
However, it is important to recognise that there is a range of such 
techniques, and not all of them are regarded as patently unethical and 
objectionable. The strategies that are commonly regarded as 
counterproductive include making an extreme offer before following up 
with small concessions, misrepresenting facts or lying and using 
intimidating behaviour to pressurise rather than persuade the other 
party. Nevertheless, there are other distributive bargaining strategies 
that are regarded as acceptable and prudent techniques in certain 
situations, including articulating principled positions, controlling the 
negotiation agenda, asking probing questions to force counterparts to 
logically assess their positions and offering to split the difference.79 As 
such, good faith negotiation may not be simply a matter of disavowing 
adversarial negotiation in totality. Rather, the focus should be on 
delineating acceptable and objectionable negotiation conduct, taking 
into account the wide range of negotiation strategies being used. The 
labels for negotiation styles per se do not fully explain the skills or 
techniques used80 or offer complete guidance on the acceptable 
strategies. 
40 Furthermore, the latest dispute resolution scholarship has 
argued that an effective negotiator may flexibly adopt techniques that 
are associated with both co-operative and competitive negotiations 
styles. Schneider suggested that an effective negotiator will be able to 
move along different styles in any one negotiation. Similarly, Mayer, 
reflecting on the paradox between co-operation and competition, 
pointed out that both elements are usually present in every negotiation 
communication.81 Lax and Sebenius further argued that both integrative 
                                                          
78 Bernard Mayer, The Conflict Paradox: Seven Dilemmas at the Core of Disputes 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2015) at p 45, referring to Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation (Basic Books, Rev Ed, 2006). 
79 Charles Craver, “Distributive Negotiation Techniques” in The Negotiator’s Desk 
Reference (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman gen eds) (Minnesota: DRI 
Press, 2017) ch 6 at pp 75–88. 
80 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “Teaching a New Negotiation Skills Paradigm” (2012) 
39 Wash U J L & Pol’y 13 at 23. 
81 Bernard Mayer, The Conflict Paradox: Seven Dilemmas at the Core of Disputes 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2015) at pp 48–50. 
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and distributive strategies must be used for effective negotiation because 
each negotiation has both value-creating and value-claiming 
opportunities.82 The upshot is that effective negotiation – be it 
integrative, distributive or an amalgamation of several styles – need not 
and does not sacrifice one’s interests. It also does not preclude the use of 
value-claiming techniques that will help advance one’s interests, 
although some of these strategies have been criticised as objectionable 
and unethical. Many of the techniques linked to the integrative 
approach have been shown to be more effective than extreme hard 
bargaining strategies in reaching optimal outcomes. Hence, the 
conceptual difficulty with good faith conduct is easily overcome with a 
deeper and more accurate understanding of the nuanced negotiation 
process. 
(3) Is it practical to impose a duty of good faith in mediation? 
41 The final dilemma concerns the feasibility of imposing a good 
faith obligation. Commentators have expressed reservations about 
defining good faith with certainty. Lande in particular takes the view 
that good faith is an uncertain and elusive concept. In his opinion, good 
faith negotiation cannot be equated with making reasonable offers 
because it is highly inappropriate for the courts to force parties to make 
offers or to second-guess whether the offers are reasonable.83 Others 
have suggested an exclusionary approach. In other words, good faith 
can be understood by delineating forms of bad faith conduct, such as 
using the mediation process for discovery purposes, making 
misrepresentations and using threats.84 Even if there were some degree 
of certainty in defining the concept, it is a tall order to require the courts 
to ascertain the parties’ state of mind in order to understand their 
subjective intentions. In this respect, a few US commentators have 
argued that the assessment of negotiation conduct is context-specific 
and poses great difficulty to the courts’ adoption of a consistent stance 
                                                          
82 Rishi Batra, “Integrative & Distributive Bargaining” in The Negotiator’s Desk 
Reference (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman gen eds) (Minnesota: DRI 
Press, 2017) ch 3 at p 40, referring to David A Lax & James Sebenius, The Manager 
As Negotiator (New York: Free Press, 1986) and Peter Adler, “The Protean 
Negotiator” in The Negotiator’s Desk Reference (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris 
Honeyman gen eds) (Minnesota: DRI Press, 2017) ch 8. 
83 John Lande, “Why a Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad Idea for Mediation” (2005) 
23 Alt to High Cost Litig 1 at 2. 
84 Tania Sourdin, “Good Faith, Bad Faith: Making an Effort in Dispute Resolution” 
(2012) 2 DICTUM – Victoria L Sch J 19 at 24, referring to Elizabeth Peden, “The 
Meaning of Contractual ‘Good Faith’” (2002) 22(3) Australian Bar Review 235 
at 235; Nadja Alexander, “Good Faith As the Absence of Bad Faith: The Excluder 
Theory in Mediation” (2009) 11(4) ADR 75, referring to Robert Summers, “‘Good 
Faith’ in General Contract Law and the Sales Provision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code” (1968) 54 Va L Rev 195. 
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in enforcing good faith obligations.85 Moreover, the above discussion on 
the latest dispute resolution studies underscores the difficulty in 
accurately understanding the nuances of a wide range of negotiation 
strategies. It has been further asserted that the imposition of a nebulous 
obligation potentially breeds distrust amongst the disputants within 
mediation and may result in satellite litigation.86 Because of these 
reservations, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section on Dispute 
Resolution strongly opposed the use of broad good faith requirements. 
It noted that imposing sanctions for subjective behaviour – including 
the failure to make a reasonable offer, and a failure for a representative 
to have sufficient authority – creates a grave risk of undermining core 
values of mediation and creating unintended problems. It further 
proposed imposing sanctions for the “violation of rules specifying 
objectively-determinable conduct”, including the failure to attend the 
mediation and the failure to submit the requisite mediation statements. 
42 Notwithstanding the concerns about the feasibility and 
prudence of imposing a good faith obligation, there appears to be 
agreement amongst commentators that some form of sanction is needed 
to deter egregious conduct within mediation. The disagreement relates 
to how widely such objectionable conduct is defined. The ABA 
suggested the penalisation of clearly identifiable and specific 
requirements and refraining from framing these requirements as broad 
good faith obligations. However, such an approach will fail to detect 
other egregious conduct that seeks to gain strategic advantage within 
mediation or impose hardship, such as using mediation as a fishing 
expedition.87 The NADRAC in Australia thus took the view that the 
express stipulation of acceptable conduct would “make clear and remind 
ADR participants of the behaviour that is expected of them” and 
enhance the integrity of the mediation process. As such, the courts 
                                                          
85 Peter N Thompson, “Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio 
St J on Disp Resol 363 at 364–366 and 374, referring to David S Winston, Notes 
and Comments, “Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: ‘You 
Can Lead a Horse to Water’” (1996) 11 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 187 at 198 (noting 
that a good faith requirement forces courts to make subjective evaluations of the 
parties’ motives rather than conduct and leads to “exhaustive investigations” that 
undercut judicial economy and efficiency); John Lande, “Using Dispute System 
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected 
Mediation Programs” (2002) 50 UCLA L Rev 69 at 106. 
86 Wayne Brazil, “Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and the 
Future of ADR: A View from the Courts” (2002) 2 J Disp Resol 11 at 29; Peter 
N Thompson, “Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio St J 
on Disp Resol 363 at 374; John Lande, “Why a Good-Faith Requirement is a Bad 
Idea for Mediation” (2005) 23 Alt to High Cost Lit 1 at 4. 
87 Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) 
J Disp Resol 367. 
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should not be completely barred from evaluating the parties’ conduct in 
the totality of the circumstances. 
43 This author suggests that a good faith obligation will, on 
balance, send a correct signal about the expected conduct within 
mediation. The expected behaviour of meaningful participation in 
mediation without the taking of strategic advantage should be 
articulated, particularly for court-connected or statutorily mandated 
mediation programmes. However, to ensure the feasibility of enforcing 
the obligation, it is proposed that sanctions be imposed only for 
breaches of objective requirements such as attendance at mediation and 
submission of documents, and the presence of highly egregious conduct 
such as making misrepresentations or threats and being clearly 
unengaged within mediation. This proposal will provide a sufficiently 
high threshold for sanctioning bad faith conduct and consequently 
avoid the uncertainty in the courts’ evaluation of more ambiguous 
conduct such as making “unreasonable offers”. In addition, the veil of 
confidentiality and inadmissibility should not be readily lifted to 
evaluate the parties’ conduct. In this regard, NADRAC recommended 
that the leave of the court should be obtained before any evidence is 
admitted for the purpose of enforcing a conduct standard, and the court 
should carefully balance the public interest in confidentiality of ADR 
against the interest in the administration of justice before granting 
leave.88 This is precisely the approach that the Singapore Mediation Act 
has adopted. The stance of lifting the veil of confidentiality in very 
limited and carefully considered circumstances will ensure that the good 
faith obligation is not abused. 
B. Whether there is a good faith obligation in Singapore 
(1) Good faith negotiation 
44 Notwithstanding the advantages of mandating the need for 
good faith conduct, Singapore has yet to impose such a statutory or 
common law obligation. As alluded to earlier, there has been judicial 
discussion in the Singapore courts on whether a contractual term to 
negotiate in good faith is valid, and whether the approach in the English 
decision of Walford should be followed. In HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd,89 the 
tenancy agreement between the two parties provided that the rent for 
each new term was to be determined by agreement according to a 
                                                          
88 National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Maintaining and 
Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Process: From Principles to Practice through People 
(February 2011) at p 36. 
89 [2012] 4 SLR 738. 
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stipulated rent review mechanism. The mechanism further stated that 
the parties “shall in good faith endeavour to agree on the prevailing 
market rental value of the Demised Premises”. The respondent 
subsequently approached seven valuation firms unilaterally and did not 
disclose the existence of these valuations to the appellant. In deciding 
the overall issue of whether the respondent had breached the relevant 
good faith clause, the Court of Appeal considered the question of 
whether the clause was valid. 
45 Significantly, the court departed from the position in Walford. 
V K Rajah JA, writing on behalf of the court, noted the existing criticism 
of Walford and stated that the decision did “not have the effect of 
invalidating an express term in a contract which employs the language 
of good faith”. The court added that it was not contrary to public policy 
to uphold such a term, because good faith clauses were likely to promote 
Singapore’s cultural value of resolving disputes consensually whenever 
possible. Furthermore, Rajah JA highlighted that the circumstances 
here were distinguishable from the facts in Walford. Unlike the 
pre-contractual negotiations in the latter case, the parties here agreed to 
negotiate as part of an overarching contractual framework to implement 
the contract. Negotiations in such a context need not necessarily be 
adversarial and hostile, but called for a more consensual approach. 
46 The court further considered the common objection raised 
concerning the lack of certainty of a good faith obligation. Rajah JA 
stated that the concept of good faith entailed the subjective element of 
acting honestly, and the objective element of observing accepted 
commercial standards of fair dealing in performing the agreed 
obligation.90 In the present circumstances, the obligation to “in good 
faith endeavour to agree” on the new rent required the parties to 
co-operate fully to facilitate the determination of the new rent. It was 
sufficiently certain and capable of being observed, as it was not difficult 
to ascertain what reasonable commercial standards required for this 
situation. Distinguishing Walford from the present case, the court 
pointed out that the issue here was not a broad one of whether the court 
could compel the parties to determine the rent in good faith, but a very 
specific question of whether the respondent, in unilaterally obtaining 
valuations of the market rental value, had breached its duty to “in good 
faith negotiate in good faith” on the rental. In addition, the court 
suggested that an obligation to negotiate in good faith, similar to an 
agreement to mediate and “best endeavour” clauses, did not mean that 
                                                          
90 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore 
Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 at [45] and [47]. 
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an agreement was guaranteed, but that the parties would try as far as 
reasonably possible to reach an agreement.91 
47 Having concluded that the term was valid, the court went on to 
consider the content of the good faith obligation. Taking into account 
the specific context of the rent review mechanism, Rajah JA found that it 
envisaged a process of collaboration and joint action by requiring them 
to genuinely endeavour on the new rent under the first stage, and then 
requiring them to jointly appoint three valuers under the second stage. 
Faithfulness to their common purpose meant that the parties should not 
attempt to unfairly profit from the known ignorance of the other party. 
Accordingly, reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing necessarily 
dictated the disclosure of all material information which could have an 
impact on the negotiations, including the unilateral valuations 
commissioned by the respondent. 
48 This case has several noteworthy implications in relation to the 
present discussion of good faith conduct in mediation. First, the Court 
of Appeal displayed receptivity to the possibility of enforcing a 
contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith. It relied heavily on the 
public policy of encouraging the consensual resolution of disputes in 
reaching this conclusion. It further commented that there was no 
difference between an agreement to mediate and agreement to negotiate 
in good faith, thus dispelling any doubt about the validity of mediation 
clauses and the integral role played by mediation in the legal 
landscape.92 Given that the mediation process essentially involves 
facilitated negotiation, it is arguable that the Singapore courts may also 
be willing in the future to recognise a contractual agreement to 
participate in mediation in good faith. However, this could be a very 
faint possibility for a few reasons. Foremost of all is how the court took 
pains to highlight how this decision turned on the particular facts. It 
found the clause to be sufficiently certain because it was not a bare 
agreement to negotiate, but one that specified details of a review 
mechanism. The decision also was premised on the fact that the parties 
were in a contractual relationship that required co-operation, unlike the 
pre-contractual relationship between the parties in Walford.93 
                                                          
91 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore 
Pte Ltd [2012] 4 SLR 738 at [43]. 
92 Joel Lee, “Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith: HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd” [2013] 
SingJLS 212 at 221. 
93 Joel Lee, “Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith: HSBC Institutional Trust 
Services (Singapore) Ltd v Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd” [2013] 
SingJLS 212 at 218. Lee posed the question of what the court would have done if 
the clause in question merely stated that “the parties agree to negotiate in good 
faith the rent for the new rent period” without any specification of when Stage Two 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Furthermore, it is probably unlikely for a future case to involve a private 
agreement to mediate in good faith. Most commercial agreements will, 
at most, include an agreement to refer the matter for mediation, without 
further stipulating an obligation to act in good faith within the 
mediation process. In many jurisdictions, the good faith obligation to 
mediate has been imposed by legislation and not through mutual 
agreement. Hence, it remains uncertain whether Singapore case law will 
favour a good faith obligation within mediation. 
49 However, this decision still bodes well for the future legal 
developments on good faith within mediation. It is pertinent that the 
court showed a sound understanding of negotiation conduct in the 
commercial setting. Citing the Australian decision of Aiton Australia Pty 
Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd94 with approval, it acknowledged that 
negotiation in good faith did not involve acting against one’s self-
interest. It also implicitly recognised that an obligation to negotiate in 
good faith was not equivalent to an agreement to agree, which is, of 
course, unenforceable. When discussing the objective element of 
fairness embedded within the concept of good faith, the court appeared 
to emphasise the need to make reasonable efforts to reach an agreement. 
Thus, Singapore’s apex court appears to be analysing negotiation 
conduct in a realistic way that is consistent with current dispute 
resolution thought. 
(2) Expected conduct within court-connected mediation in Singapore 
50 Notwithstanding the absence of a good faith obligation within 
Singapore case law and legislation, there are clear indications of the 
expected conduct within court-connected mediation in the State Courts 
and Family Justice Courts. The State Courts Centre for Dispute 
Resolution provides both mediation, conciliation and neutral evaluation 
services for civil disputes below $250,000 in value, minor criminal 
offences, harassment claims and community disputes. The Family 
Justice Courts provide mediation and counselling services for family 
disputes. Family matters involving children are mediated in the Child 
                                                                                                                               
of the rent review mechanism would kick in. This author submits that courts 
should adopt a practical and robust approach to this and imply a reasonable period 
of time (appropriate for the context and complexity of the negotiation in question) 
for the negotiations to be conducted. This would be supported by the court’s 
statement that parties are obligated to “try as far as reasonably possible to reach an 
agreement”. He also stated (at 219) that it is clear from the case that the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling is limited to agreements to negotiate in the context of a 
pre-existing contractual relationship. In this regard, he argues that the validity of 
agreements to negotiate (as opposed to agreements to agree) should be equally 
valid where there is no pre-existing contractual relationship. 
94 [1999] 153 FLR 236. 
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Focused Resolution Centre, while disputes involving divorcing couples 
and maintenance of children or spouses are mediated at the Family 
Resolution Chambers and Maintenance Mediation Chambers 
respectively. 
51 Both courts have stipulated minimal standards that are 
objectively identifiable. The State Courts’ Practice Directions95 require 
each party to file an opening statement in the prescribed format at least 
two working days before the mediation session. It is also explicitly stated 
that all the parties and their conducting solicitors are to attend the 
mediation in person and be present throughout the session. Parties who 
are corporate bodies must send representatives possessing the authority 
to settle. In other words, the representative must be “the most 
knowledgeable about the case and is able to recommend a settlement to 
the representative’s board or body”.96 Notably, the Practice Directions 
provide that the court may impose sanctions for absence from the 
mediation or lateness without any valid reason.97 These sanctions 
include the dismissal of the action or defence under O 34A r 6 of the 
Rules of Court, and making adverse cost orders after a trial under O 59 
r 5(c) to “take into account the parties’ conduct in relation to any 
attempt at resolving the cause or matter by mediation or any other 
means of dispute resolution”. It is arguable that the courts may also make 
adverse costs orders under O 59 r 5 for blatant breaches of the 
requirements to file mediation opening statements and to send the most 
appropriate persons to attend the mediation. The relevant wording in 
this rule has been framed broadly to allow the court to consider any 
conduct “in relation to … mediation”. However, there has yet to be any 
reported decision that has invoked this provision to impose sanctions 
for unacceptable conduct within the mediation process. It remains to be 
seen whether the court will also impose robust sanctions for other 
objectionable conduct such as abusing the mediation process for 
collateral purposes, or failing to participate meaningfully in the 
mediation. 
52 The Family Justice Courts’ requirements on conduct within 
court-connected mediation are largely similar to the State Courts’ 
Practice Directions. These courts’ practice directions also state that both 
parties and their lawyers must personally attend the mediation sessions. 
The lawyers are exempted from attending counselling sessions.98 
                                                          
95 Effective 1 May 2019. 
96 State Courts Practice Directions (effective 1 May 2019) para 41(6). 
97 State Courts Practice Directions (effective 1 May 2019) paras 35(28) and 35(29). 
98 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) paras 11(12) 
and 11(13). See also Kevin Ng, Yarni Loi, Sophia Ang & Sylvia Tan, “Family Justice 
Courts – Innovations, Initiatives and Programmes, An Evolution over Time” 
(2018) 30 SAcLJ 617. 
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Additionally, parties are required to file a summary of mediation in the 
court’s prescribed format, providing details on children’s issues, division 
of matrimonial assets and maintenance.99 For family disputes involving 
children, the court will convene a pre-mediation session termed a 
“Family Dispute Resolution Conference” in order to have a preliminary 
discussion of the issues affecting the children, crystallise the issues in 
contention, give directions on the filing of appropriate documents and 
direct the attendance of mediation or counselling.100 The parties and 
their counsel are also expected to “come prepared to discuss all issues 
relating to or impacting the … children”.101 Although the Family Justice 
Courts have not expressly stated that the failure to adhere to these 
requirements will be sanctioned, it is highly likely that the courts are 
empowered to penalise the parties under r 10 of the Family Justice Rules 
2014,102 which allows the court to partially or wholly set aside the 
proceedings or make any other appropriate order, whenever there is 
failure to comply with the relevant rules.103 Consequently, 
notwithstanding the absence of a reference to a “good faith” 
requirement, both the State Courts and Family Justice Courts have 
stipulated very specific standards on expected mediation conduct, with 
any breaches being potentially sanctioned by the court. 
53 Apart from court-conducted mediation, the Singapore courts 
also refer matters to external mediation providers, notably the Singapore 
Mediation Centre (“SMC”). There is, naturally, less control over the 
parties’ conduct in external mediation programmes compared to court-
connected mediation, and, consequently, more limited standards that 
are stipulated by the relevant procedural rules. Since 1 January 2019, 
matrimonial proceedings with no contested child issues and involving 
assets worth $2m and above have been referred for private mediation 
conducted by SMC. The Family Justice Courts’ Practice Directions104 
have imposed minimal standards on the expected participation in such 
mediations: the parties are merely given directions and timelines to 
agree on a mediation date and to exchange documents.105 By 
comparison, there are no standards imposed by the High Court and 
                                                          
99 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) Form 191. 
100 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) paras 11(11) 
and 12(3). 
101 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) paras 12(3) 
and 12(4). 
102 S 813/2014. 
103 While r 10 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (S 813/2014) relates to non-compliance 
of the Family Justice Rules, r 7 states that “[p]ractice directions may make 
additional provisions in relation to the requirements for any application in the 
Family Justice Courts”. Arguably, the court can exercise its power under this rule 
for breaches of practice directions. 
104 Updated 10 May 2019. 
105 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) para 11(4). 
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Court of Appeal in relation to civil cases that undergo external 
mediation. The courts’ intervention is limited to encouraging the parties 
to consider attempting ADR at the earliest possible stage of the 
proceedings. Once all the parties indicate their willingness to attempt 
ADR, the court will adjourn the pending court proceedings and give 
timelines for the completion of the ADR process.106 
(3) The focus on entry into mediation instead of conduct within 
mediation 
54 It is evident that the Singapore courts focus principally on 
encouraging parties to attempt mediation, and have adopted a lighter 
touch in regulating conduct within the mediation process. Taking a leaf 
from the English approach, the Supreme Court and State Courts have 
stressed how any unreasonable refusal to attempt ADR may be taken 
into account by the courts in making post-trial costs orders. The courts 
have introduced several pretrial mechanisms to enable them to assess 
the parties’ and their lawyers’ decision to refuse the use of ADR. Under 
the Supreme Court pretrial process, a party may file an “ADR Offer” to 
the opposing party to propose the use of ADR. The other party is 
obliged to file a “Response to ADR Offer” within 14 days of being served 
the offer, stating its decision and giving reasons for declining the offer to 
attempt ADR. A failure to file a response will be deemed to evince an 
unwillingness to use ADR without providing any justification.107 The 
State Courts have adopted a similar mechanism for civil cases of a lower 
value. All parties have to file an “ADR Form” at the pretrial stage to 
confirm that their lawyers have explained the available ADR options to 
them, and to indicate their decision as to ADR. Any refusal to use ADR 
also has to be explained. Both the Supreme Court and State Courts have 
provided information and guidelines to help the parties understand the 
different forms of ADR and to make an informed decision on 
attempting ADR. 
55 Significantly, the courts have placed a duty on lawyers to 
explore ADR options with their clients. The Supreme Court and Family 
Justice Courts state in their respective practice directions that it is “the 
professional duty of advocates and solicitors to advise their clients about 
mediation”.108 The State Courts require the lawyers and their clients to 
certify in the ADR Form that they have discussed the benefits of using 
ADR. The Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules109 were also 
amended in 2017 to reiterate that a practitioner must evaluate with his 
                                                          
106 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) para 35C(4). 
107 Family Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) para 35C. 
108 Supreme Court Practice Directions effective 1 May 2019) para 35B(2); Family 
Justice Courts Practice Directions (updated 10 May 2019) para 11(1A). 
109 S 706/2015. 
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or her client the use of ADR processes and evaluate whether the 
consequences of pursuing the matter justifies the attendant risks and 
expenses.110 Hence, the overall legislative framework in Singapore 
concentrates on bringing appropriate disputes to the mediation table 
instead of regulating conduct within mediation. There is no explicit 
good faith duty that is imposed in relation to the decision to attempt or 
decline ADR. Nonetheless, the spectre of costs sanctions, coupled with 
potential disciplinary proceedings for professional misconduct, has 
resulted in the need for parties to persuade the court why a refusal to 
use ADR is a “reasonable” decision, a concept that is somewhat akin to 
“good faith”. 
C. Potential good faith requirements for lawyers and parties 
56 The concept of good faith participation in mediation remains a 
fairly controversial one. The common law jurisdictions are divided in 
their views on whether imposing this requirement will be counter-
productive for the overall integrity and confidentiality of the mediation 
process. Many of the objections stem from a recognition that legal 
mechanisms are blunt tools in bringing about meaningful participation 
in a consensual process. Both the US and Australian commentators have 
therefore recommended greater reliance on education, regulation of 
mediators and reform of the legal profession in order to encourage 
adherence to standards on mediation conduct. Likewise, this author 
proposes a multi-pronged approach which includes limited legislative 
regulation of mediation conduct. Any statutorily imposed legislation 
should also be confined to sanctioning very egregious conduct or the 
failure to observe objective requirements such as attending the 
mediation. 
57 The case law, legislation and guidelines on legal professional 
conduct in Australia and the US are instructive in shedding light on the 
type of egregious mediation conduct that is deemed to evince bad faith. 
The two tables below list some examples. These types of conduct could 
potentially be instances in which bad faith conduct is sanctioned by the 
courts, in the event that a good faith duty is legislatively introduced. 
                                                          
110 Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (S 706/2015) r 17(2)(e); 
Dorcas Quek Anderson, “Supreme Court Practice Directions (Amendment No 1 of 
2016): A Significant Step in Further Incorporating ADR into the Civil Justice 
Process” Singapore Law Gazette (March 2016). 
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Table 1: General obligations of parties 
Conduct deemed to 
be unacceptable 
Examples 
Failure to attend 
court-ordered 
mediation 
Seidel v Bradberry:111 Defendant did not attend 
mediation and refused to communicate with parties 
before and after mediation. 
Blatant lateness for 
mediation 
Pitts v Francis:112 Defendant arrived several hours 
late for mandated mediation, wearing inappropriate 
attire. 
Failure to produce 
pre-mediation 
memorandum 
Nick v Morgan’s Foods Inc:113 Defendant refused to 
submit mediation memorandum, contending that it 
was a waste of time. 
Representative who 
attends does not 
have authority to 
settle 
Francis v Women’s Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
Group:114 Defendant initially requested court for 
different mediation date and stated that it did not 
know the scope of plaintiff ’s claim, then stated at 
mediation that there was no authority to settle 
because of unsettled insurance coverage issues. 
G Heileman Brewing Co v Joseph Oat Corp:115 
Company’s representative who attended had no 
authority to make any offer. 
Clear refusal to 
participate in 
mediation 
Texas Department of Transportation v Pirtle:116 
Defendant refused to participate in mediation in 
court-ordered mediation and indicated to trial judge 
early on that he would not be participating. 
                                                          
111 1988 WL 386161 (ND Tex, 7 July 1998), described in Rachel Hutchings, “Defining 
Good Faith Participation in Mediation” (2007) 1 Am J Mediation 41 at 45. 
112 2007 WL 4482168 (ND Fla, 19 Dec 2007), discussed in Peter N Thompson, “Good 
Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 363 
at 413. 
113 99 F Supp 2d 1056 (ED Mo, 2000), affirmed in 270 F 3d 590 (8th Cir, 2001), 
discussed in Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns 
and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations” 
(2002) J Disp Resol 367 at 388. 
114 144 FRD 646 (WDNY, 1992), referred to in Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little 
(Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate 
Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) J Disp Resol 367 at 389–390. 
115 871 F 2d 648 (7th Cir, 1989), discussed in John Lande, “Using Dispute System 
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected 
Mediation Programs” (2002) 50 UCLA L Rev 69 at 95. 
116 977 SW 2d 657 (Tex App, 1998). 
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Using mediation to 
threaten opposing 
party 
Del Fuoco v Wells:117 Plaintiff used mediation to 
pressurise defendant to accept settlement demand of 
US$500,000 with legal costs, and made threat to 




Outar v Greno Industries Inc:118 Plaintiff refused to 
negotiate or speak, or allow his attorney to speak on 
his behalf, although requested repeatedly. 
Brooks v Lincoln National Life Insurance Co:119 
Plaintiff refused to respond to defendant’s initial 
offer and told mediator that they had five minutes to 
submit a serious offer or they would leave the 
mediation. 
In re AT Reynolds & Sons Inc:120 Party repeatedly 
responded to inquiries by stating that they were not 
open to compromise that involved taking a single 
dollar out of its pocket, and made no offer until after 
being told that that the mediator would report them 
for bad faith mediation. 
Aiton Australia v Transfield Pty Ltd:121 The court 
stated that mediating in good faith involves having 
an open mind in the sense of willingness to consider 
offers and consider putting forward options for 
resolution of the dispute. 
Making 
misrepresentations 
that mislead the 
opposing party 
Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins:122 In a 
mediation involving personal injuries, the plaintiff 
failed to disclose to defendant that the plaintiff had 
been diagnosed with terminal cancer, leading to a 
settlement that was made based on inaccurate 
information. 
                                                          
117 2005 WL 2291720 (MD Fla, 20 September 2005), discussed in Rachel Hutchings, 
“Defining Good Faith Participation in Mediation” (2007) 1 Am J Mediation 41 
at 44. 
118 2005 WL 238840 (NDNY, 27 September 2005), discussed in Rachel Hutchings, 
“Defining Good Faith Participation in Mediation” (2007) 1 Am J Mediation 41 
at 43. 
119 2006 WL 2487937 (D Neb, 25 August 2006), discussed in Peter N Thompson, 
“Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 
363 at 411. 
120 424 BR 76 (Bankr SDNY, 2010), discussed in Peter N Thompson, “Good Faith 
Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 363 at 410. 
121 [1999] 153 FLR 236 at [156]. 
122 [2006] LPT 012, discussed in Bobette Wolski, “The Truth about Honesty and 
Candour in Mediation: What the Tribunal Left Unsaid in Mullins’ Case” (2012) 
36 Melb U L Rev 706. 
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Table 2: Lawyers’ obligations in mediation 





Rule 4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct prohibits a lawyer from knowingly making 
a false statement of material fact to a third person; 
however, it is thought that certain statements that 
are akin to “puffing” or hyperbole will not offend 
this rule.123 
Law Council of Australia’s Guidelines for Lawyers in 
Mediation124 state that lawyers should never mislead 
and should be careful of puffing. 
Failure to keep client 
informed, resulting 
in client’s absence 
from mediation 
Roberts v Rose:125 Solicitor informed mediator of a 
conflict of the mediation date with his schedule but 
did not confirm whether the mediation was 
rescheduled, and failed to inform his client about 
the mediation until after the mediation date. 
Clearly hostile and 
non-cooperative 
within mediation 
Graham v Baker:126 Solicitor was hostile to the 
mediator and the opposing party, refusing to 
co-operate or to give the opponent an opportunity 
to put forward a proposal, issued an ultimatum and 
became belligerent during mediation. 
Law Council of Australia’s Guidelines for Lawyers in 
Mediation urges lawyers to be cautious about giving 
“final offers” or ultimatums which can damage 
credibility for future negotiations.127 
                                                          
123 John Sherrill, “Ethics for Lawyers Representing Clients in Mediations” (2012) 
6 Am J Mediation 29 at 33, referring to comments to the Georgia ethical rules 
recognising that puffing is part of the negotiation process and is only disallowed 
when it materially misstates facts. 
124 Updated August 2011. 
125 37 SW 3d 31 (Tex App, 2000), referred to in Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little 
(Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate 
Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) J Disp Resol 367 at 381. 
126 447 NW 2d 397 (Iowa, 1989), referred to in Roger L Carter, “Oh, Ye of Little 
(Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate 
Participant Conduct in Mediations” (2002) J Disp Resol 367 at 382 (note that the 
final court reversed the decision). 
127 Law Council of Australia, Guidelines for Lawyers in Mediations (updated August 
2011) at para 6.2. 
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Frustrating 
mediation by filing 
application right 
before mediation 
Fisher v SmithKline Beecham Corp: Defendant’s 
counsel filed summary judgment application on eve 
of mediation, then limited its mediation 
presentation to providing a copy of the summary 
judgment application and stating that it would not 
consider settlement unless the plaintiff could 
explain why the summary judgment application 
would fail.128 
IV. Conclusion 
58 With the passing of the Mediation Act and the 
institutionalisation of mediation in various sectors, mediation has 
matured as a dispute resolution process within Singapore. The 
incorporation of mediation within the formal justice system necessitates 
a closer examination of the legal regime that supports the growth of 
mediation. However, the creation of sound legal principles ultimately 
hinges on an accurate understanding and careful balancing of the 
competing values underlying the mediation process. This situation is 
best exemplified by the clash of mediation confidentiality and the public 
interest in ensuring meaningful participation. These two needs appear 
to be irreconcilable. They also raise difficult questions concerning the 
desired negotiation behaviour, the feasibility of mandating good faith 
conduct, the tension between informal and formal modes of dispute 
resolution and the appropriate scope of public intervention in a 
consensual and private process. 
59 This author has sought to discuss the fundamental issues 
underlying the question of piercing the veil of confidentiality to enforce 
good faith conduct in mediation. It has been argued that good faith is 
consistent with strategic negotiation, and should also be highly 
encouraged to protect the integrity of the mediation process. To that 
end, it is recommended that a good faith participation obligation is 
articulated in appropriate legislation. At the same time, the threshold for 
the breach of this duty should be a high one so as to facilitate the 
enforcement of the duty and to prevent the unnecessary lifting of the 
veil of mediation confidentiality. The informal and private nature of the 
mediation process, which is placed within a formal justice system, has to 
be preserved. Yet the need to ensure access to justice also necessitates 
limited scrutiny of mediation communications. It is not an impossible 
                                                          
128 2008 WL 4501860 (WDNY, 29 September 2008), referred to in Peter N Thompson, 
“Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts” (2011) 26 Ohio St J on Disp 
Resol 363 at 411. 
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tension to resolve, but is one that will be more acute with the growing 
institutionalisation and maturing of mediation in the future. 
 
